Tuesday, September 15, 2009
The Brain and Mind Are Not the Same Thing!
Fresh off Gene Callahan's discussion of methodology and the analyst's decision to impute intelligence to a process, we have this NPR interview on Neal Conan's "Talk of the Nation." (Click here to get either the transcript or to listen to the audio.) In general it's a fascinating interview for our health care debate. Leftists will love to hear the good doctor (a neurosurgeon who worked in Ukraine) criticize the "wastefulness" of Western medicine, whereas Hannity fans will love to hear him explain the need for paying doctors under the table and how jealous doctors brought a lawsuit against their more successful rival.
But here's the part that most interested me:
We could just as well have a cosmetic surgeon talk about filling people's lips with Botox and saying, "It's really amazing to think that I'm staring at love. Love is a physical thing. Wow."
If you'll excuse me, I'm going to throw Human Action on a scale and see how much Austrian economics weighs.
But here's the part that most interested me:
CONAN: I just have time for one last question. I guess it's a personal one. I had somehow always imagined that once you opened up the skull and looked in, it would be pretty easy to tell the difference between regular brain matter and a tumor. I suppose I thought it was green or yellow or something.Oh boy. Even though this guy obviously has forgotten more about how the brain works than I will ever know, he is falling prey to the crudest of fallacies. The brain is a physical thing; the mind is an abstract thing. He is not "discovering" that the mind is really "right there at the end of my scalpel!" No, he is relying on a theory of materialism and asserting it.
Dr. MARSH: No. It depends on the tumor. But the particular sort of tumor you see in the film and the particular sort of tumor I specialize in operating in Britain, the tumor looks like the brain. It doesn't quite feel like the brain when you're working on it with your neurosurgical sucker, but visually, it's more or less the same. And this is why they're so difficult, because the more you remove, the more the risk is you'll stray into the brain and cause damage.
And that is why, with operations of this sort, increasingly, and in Britain (unintelligible) where I pioneered technique, you operate with the patient awake under local anesthetic, so you can see if you're starting to produce any significant brain damage as you operate.
CONAN: And you say something fascinating as you're doing that. You're looking at it and saying, it's impossible to believe, really, but that is thought.
Dr. MARSH: Yes.
CONAN: That is consciousness I'm looking at.
Dr. MARSH: It is extraordinary. And I still, in fact, the more I think about it as I get older, the more extraordinary and incomprehensible I find it, that thought - that mind is a physical entity. It's a hugely revolutionary idea which none of us have really quite come to terms with, I think, yet.
We could just as well have a cosmetic surgeon talk about filling people's lips with Botox and saying, "It's really amazing to think that I'm staring at love. Love is a physical thing. Wow."
If you'll excuse me, I'm going to throw Human Action on a scale and see how much Austrian economics weighs.
Comments:
Bob, your analogies always manage to be equal parts hilarity and cleverness. This was a great post.
I know, I'm new here. I decided that I had been lurking for long enough.
I know, I'm new here. I decided that I had been lurking for long enough.
Bob, I`m afraid I`m not following whatever point you`re trying to make, so perhaps we can clarify terms and meanings a bit?
Sure, the brain is a physical thing, but what do you mean by "mind"? Is it self-awareness of thinking? Does the mind have no physical basis? Does one`s "mind" exist if the brain dies? When we observe the brain in action via various technologies that chart brain action, are we not also observing the mind in action?
Why do you say that "love" - and likewise anger, jealously, hunger, thirst, lust, happiness, curiosity, etc., - is NOT a physical thing? Does it have any existence apart from one`s brain and its functions?
Sure, the brain is a physical thing, but what do you mean by "mind"? Is it self-awareness of thinking? Does the mind have no physical basis? Does one`s "mind" exist if the brain dies? When we observe the brain in action via various technologies that chart brain action, are we not also observing the mind in action?
Why do you say that "love" - and likewise anger, jealously, hunger, thirst, lust, happiness, curiosity, etc., - is NOT a physical thing? Does it have any existence apart from one`s brain and its functions?
I'm with TT on this one. We Humans like to give cute little abstract labels like "love" and "jealousy" to what boils down to chemical reactions going on inside the body.
# posted by 
: September 16, 2009 at 10:54 AM
: September 16, 2009 at 10:54 AM
Some comments/questions to add:
-Bob, are you saying that the doctor stupidly failed to allow for the possibility that there might be unobservables that don't affect the observed variables? (Yes, I know, triple or quadruple negative, but you understand.) Because the brian certainly implements the mind. No brain + no observable alternate brain instantiation = no observable mind.
-Reductionism doesn't deny the existence of love or minds; it just says that they emerge (lawfully) from lower level processes, and reality only has one level.
-Reducing something to lower level processes does not trivialize it. The corollary of "Love is just the result of neurochemical reactions" is "Neurochemical reactions can be ignored once you understand love."
-Bob, are you saying that the doctor stupidly failed to allow for the possibility that there might be unobservables that don't affect the observed variables? (Yes, I know, triple or quadruple negative, but you understand.) Because the brian certainly implements the mind. No brain + no observable alternate brain instantiation = no observable mind.
-Reductionism doesn't deny the existence of love or minds; it just says that they emerge (lawfully) from lower level processes, and reality only has one level.
-Reducing something to lower level processes does not trivialize it. The corollary of "Love is just the result of neurochemical reactions" is "Neurochemical reactions can be ignored once you understand love."
Silas, I admit that I may have been unfair to the neurosurgeon; unfortunately we don't know the full context of his thoughts (brain movements?) on this.
But for everyone besides Andrew: Yes guys, I am saying love is NOT a physical thing. I don't know how else to say this. You keep wanting me to give you evidence. But by "evidence" you mean physical things. So you're right, I can't point to a physical experiment to prove that non-physical things exist.
Tom, if we burned all the copies of Austrian economics and killed all the Austrians, would the ABCT no longer exist?
What about if we burned all the geometry books and killed all the mathematicians? Would the Pythagorean Theorem still be true? Would it still be "waiting to be discovered," or would you instead say, "Someone needs to create it again." ?
But for everyone besides Andrew: Yes guys, I am saying love is NOT a physical thing. I don't know how else to say this. You keep wanting me to give you evidence. But by "evidence" you mean physical things. So you're right, I can't point to a physical experiment to prove that non-physical things exist.
Tom, if we burned all the copies of Austrian economics and killed all the Austrians, would the ABCT no longer exist?
What about if we burned all the geometry books and killed all the mathematicians? Would the Pythagorean Theorem still be true? Would it still be "waiting to be discovered," or would you instead say, "Someone needs to create it again." ?
"Reductionism doesn't deny the existence of love or minds; it just says that they emerge (lawfully) from lower level processes, and reality only has one level."
Uh, of reality has only one level, then there are no "lower-level processes"!
Uh, of reality has only one level, then there are no "lower-level processes"!
@Gene:
Uh, of reality has only one level, then there are no "lower-level processes"!
Sorry, I wasn't clear. What I meant was, reductionism says you can have different levels of model abstraction, but only one level of reality. So thermodynamics can be a *model* of statistical mechanics, but it doesn't posit additional laws; it just posits approximations of the more exact predictions of statistical mechanics.
Uh, of reality has only one level, then there are no "lower-level processes"!
Sorry, I wasn't clear. What I meant was, reductionism says you can have different levels of model abstraction, but only one level of reality. So thermodynamics can be a *model* of statistical mechanics, but it doesn't posit additional laws; it just posits approximations of the more exact predictions of statistical mechanics.
Well, Silas, certainly real things (like love or jealousy) cannot emerge from lower levels of a model of real things! Either there are real levels, from which things like love and jealousy can emerge, or there aren't, in which case you haven't explained them at all yet.
Gene: Reductionism says that (the phenomenon we identify as) love is a higher-level description (abstraction, model) of reality. But it's not on a different level of reality; it's just an observed regularity within the more fundamental laws of reality.
And wasn't claiming I "explained" love in the sense you seem to mean. I was pointing out what reductionism does and does not say.
And wasn't claiming I "explained" love in the sense you seem to mean. I was pointing out what reductionism does and does not say.
Silas,
How would reductionism account for logic? If logic is just a neurological process, it becomes irrelevant. Logical reasoning, far from being statements about reality, would become statements about the speaker's brain. This is because logic, being immaterial, does not exist physically.
So, if things like "love" and "the mind" are concepts that have their reality in the motions of atoms, logic should be included as well. And in doing that, you would undermine it.
Anyway, I hope that makes sense. It's possible that I am misunderstanding what reductionism is.
How would reductionism account for logic? If logic is just a neurological process, it becomes irrelevant. Logical reasoning, far from being statements about reality, would become statements about the speaker's brain. This is because logic, being immaterial, does not exist physically.
So, if things like "love" and "the mind" are concepts that have their reality in the motions of atoms, logic should be included as well. And in doing that, you would undermine it.
Anyway, I hope that makes sense. It's possible that I am misunderstanding what reductionism is.
I'm not with TT on this one. We Humans like to give cute little labels like "chemicals" and "materials" to mere perceptions of the mind.
# posted by : September 16, 2009 at 2:59 PM
: September 16, 2009 at 2:59 PM
@Andrew_Smith: Actually, yes, logic does correspond to a large-scale regularity of particle motions:
-It refers to the regularity of inferences people and machines will draw when applying logical rules. (Yes, they make mistakes, but you are more likely to guess what they will do by performing the same logical computation separately than if you guessed randomly, which is what a regularity means.)
-Also, the universe does recognize purely-logical truths in that these are the only truths that can be verified in a thermodynamically reversible manner. All others require irreversible entanglement between two parts of the universe. See more here and here.
People use logic (and related logical concepts like counting, addition, etc.) -- i.e. people attempt to approximate logical operations with their brains -- if and to the exent that there is a mapping to useful situations.
So logic is not "just" a neurological process, but it is a process that can be implemented in several media.
@Brian_Shelley: Actually, we like to give cute little labels to sufficiently regular and common perceptions of the mind.
-It refers to the regularity of inferences people and machines will draw when applying logical rules. (Yes, they make mistakes, but you are more likely to guess what they will do by performing the same logical computation separately than if you guessed randomly, which is what a regularity means.)
-Also, the universe does recognize purely-logical truths in that these are the only truths that can be verified in a thermodynamically reversible manner. All others require irreversible entanglement between two parts of the universe. See more here and here.
People use logic (and related logical concepts like counting, addition, etc.) -- i.e. people attempt to approximate logical operations with their brains -- if and to the exent that there is a mapping to useful situations.
So logic is not "just" a neurological process, but it is a process that can be implemented in several media.
@Brian_Shelley: Actually, we like to give cute little labels to sufficiently regular and common perceptions of the mind.
@Bob: Yes guys, I am saying love is NOT a physical thing. I don't know how else to say this. You keep wanting me to give you evidence. But by "evidence" you mean physical things. So you're right, I can't point to a physical experiment to prove that non-physical things exist.
Sleight-of-hand. No one's making such an absurd demand. They're asking for observables that prove non-physical things exist.
Just to show you what evidence would look like, and why it's such a fair request, let me give you an example. I believe that "the fact that you and TokyoTom are the same height" is non-physical. But I don't whine about people demanding physical proof of non-physical things. Instead, I say, "the fact that you and TokyoTom are the same height" can be verified with the following observations ... .
If your claim is just that, "I believe in the existence of things that can never be observed by anyone and have no noticeable effect on the universe", then,
-No one is claiming that that they can prove you wrong.
-It's not exactly much of a leap for the doctor to ignore the existence of such things.
Sleight-of-hand. No one's making such an absurd demand. They're asking for observables that prove non-physical things exist.
Just to show you what evidence would look like, and why it's such a fair request, let me give you an example. I believe that "the fact that you and TokyoTom are the same height" is non-physical. But I don't whine about people demanding physical proof of non-physical things. Instead, I say, "the fact that you and TokyoTom are the same height" can be verified with the following observations ... .
If your claim is just that, "I believe in the existence of things that can never be observed by anyone and have no noticeable effect on the universe", then,
-No one is claiming that that they can prove you wrong.
-It's not exactly much of a leap for the doctor to ignore the existence of such things.
The way I think of it:
When I say "love", I don't mean "the process that makes me care about my wife". I mean "my subjective experience of that process". These two are not the same thing. So, even if we buy that "mind" is the product of brain processes, it does not follow that the mind (a subjective experience) and the brain are the same thing.
After all, there are things my brain does that I wouldn't say are in my "mind". For example, at night I breathe, and my brain plays a role in that. I wouldn't say that my "mind" does though.
Of course, maybe what I mean by "mind" is significantly different from what other people mean...
When I say "love", I don't mean "the process that makes me care about my wife". I mean "my subjective experience of that process". These two are not the same thing. So, even if we buy that "mind" is the product of brain processes, it does not follow that the mind (a subjective experience) and the brain are the same thing.
After all, there are things my brain does that I wouldn't say are in my "mind". For example, at night I breathe, and my brain plays a role in that. I wouldn't say that my "mind" does though.
Of course, maybe what I mean by "mind" is significantly different from what other people mean...
"Reductionism says that (the phenomenon we identify as) love is a higher-level description (abstraction, model) of reality."
But Silas, love is not a model of anything! It's a direct, phenomenological experience I have, like pain, or anger, or euphoria. And think of the problem you are setting up for yourself -- if what I experience as love is really a model of my brain states, then isn't the same true for, say, scientific insight? -- so that, when I think I'm seeing something true about the neurology of the brain, say, then all I'm really doing is modeling the configuration of particles that occurs when I think about neurology. In fact, all of our supposed mathematical and scientific truths will turn out to be merely models of what is going on in our own brain -- including our ideas about physiology that tell us that we have a brain!
I think this theory is dragging you into very deep waters, my friend.
But Silas, love is not a model of anything! It's a direct, phenomenological experience I have, like pain, or anger, or euphoria. And think of the problem you are setting up for yourself -- if what I experience as love is really a model of my brain states, then isn't the same true for, say, scientific insight? -- so that, when I think I'm seeing something true about the neurology of the brain, say, then all I'm really doing is modeling the configuration of particles that occurs when I think about neurology. In fact, all of our supposed mathematical and scientific truths will turn out to be merely models of what is going on in our own brain -- including our ideas about physiology that tell us that we have a brain!
I think this theory is dragging you into very deep waters, my friend.
"They're asking for observables that prove non-physical things exist."
Every single day, I observe myself having all sorts of mental states that don't seem to be susceptible to physical description.
Can you point me to some observable that indicates this mysterious 'physical world', existing apart from everything mental, is real? It seems to me like the idea of a 'physical world' is merely a model, an abstraction drawn from mental experience, and that you are confusing the model for the reality!
Every single day, I observe myself having all sorts of mental states that don't seem to be susceptible to physical description.
Can you point me to some observable that indicates this mysterious 'physical world', existing apart from everything mental, is real? It seems to me like the idea of a 'physical world' is merely a model, an abstraction drawn from mental experience, and that you are confusing the model for the reality!
Bob, the ABCT is an idea, based on observations, about human behavior.
If all records of the idea is erased (by eliminating all those aware of it and all recordings of it), the ABCT will cease to be. But if humans are still around and are observable, someone is likely to come up with the ABCT again.
If humans cease to exist but evidence of our presence remains, an alien archaeologist may very well come up with the idea (just as we speculate on how dinosaurs and other animals that God wiped out behaved), but of course it will remain an idea of HUMAN behavior, that will not have an objective existence apart from us.
Someday someone may try to link the ABCT to the behavior of other cooperative animals, but the ABCT will just be a subset of observations and paradigms.
With the Pythagorean theorem, aren't we talking about something closer to the structure of the universe as we perceive it, and not solely about human nature? If humans wink out of existence (along with all of our records), of course the Pythagorean theorem shall cease to be, to be rediscovered as a fairly good approximation in a Newtonian world (but off in a e=mc2 one).
BTW, I noticed that, again, you fail to answer any of my questions about what you mean by "mind". As a result, it is impossible to evaluate what you mean when you say that mind and brain are not the same thing.
If all records of the idea is erased (by eliminating all those aware of it and all recordings of it), the ABCT will cease to be. But if humans are still around and are observable, someone is likely to come up with the ABCT again.
If humans cease to exist but evidence of our presence remains, an alien archaeologist may very well come up with the idea (just as we speculate on how dinosaurs and other animals that God wiped out behaved), but of course it will remain an idea of HUMAN behavior, that will not have an objective existence apart from us.
Someday someone may try to link the ABCT to the behavior of other cooperative animals, but the ABCT will just be a subset of observations and paradigms.
With the Pythagorean theorem, aren't we talking about something closer to the structure of the universe as we perceive it, and not solely about human nature? If humans wink out of existence (along with all of our records), of course the Pythagorean theorem shall cease to be, to be rediscovered as a fairly good approximation in a Newtonian world (but off in a e=mc2 one).
BTW, I noticed that, again, you fail to answer any of my questions about what you mean by "mind". As a result, it is impossible to evaluate what you mean when you say that mind and brain are not the same thing.
We Humans like to give cute little abstract labels like "love" and "jealousy" to what boils down to chemical reactions going on inside the body.
It's not so much that we like to give abstract labels to things; speaking/communicating REQUIRES us to describe what we experience/perceive, and these labels are very helpful and, for the time being, much more helpful than saying that someone perceived that particular neurons are caught in a self-reinforced harmonic loop.
Brain-speak descriptions are more helpful when we speak of people with acknowledged organic brain defects.
But we cannot deny that we are physical beings, and that our "minds" don't appear to work well, if at all, without our brains. We can also observe that humans, like the rest of animal creation, engage in a wide range of "unminded" (un-self-aware or even nonconscious) behavior. For such behavior, discussions of "mind" are of extremely limited use.
It's not so much that we like to give abstract labels to things; speaking/communicating REQUIRES us to describe what we experience/perceive, and these labels are very helpful and, for the time being, much more helpful than saying that someone perceived that particular neurons are caught in a self-reinforced harmonic loop.
Brain-speak descriptions are more helpful when we speak of people with acknowledged organic brain defects.
But we cannot deny that we are physical beings, and that our "minds" don't appear to work well, if at all, without our brains. We can also observe that humans, like the rest of animal creation, engage in a wide range of "unminded" (un-self-aware or even nonconscious) behavior. For such behavior, discussions of "mind" are of extremely limited use.
@Gene: When you consistently have a certain kind of feeling, you give it the label "love". (And it merits having a label, in turn, because it is sufficiently common and structured that you gain from having a label for it.) That range of internal feelings has identifiable physical correlates. In distnguishing between "love" and "not love" and "near love", you are identifying regularities in (your perceptions of) the world at a high level of abstraction.
But it does correspond to a constraint on particle motions down to the lowest levels (actually, amplitude distributions if you want to be precise, but whatever), i.e. there is a set of particle motions you identify as love, as close to love, etc, even if you can't personally spell out the entire set of these particle motions. The love exists -- as such a set -- which also (through mechanisms not yet completely understood) generates your subjective experiences.
In the same way, when I identify a substance as being 50 degrees F, I am identifying a set of microstates it can be in that are consistent with the observation of its temperature.
As for the ... interesting reductio you made about scientific insight: yes, any understanding you have corresponds to a model represented by your brain. So? (Btw, this theory isn't dragging "me" anywhere; I didn't come up with it, and I'm not its sole defender.)
Every single day, I observe myself having all sorts of mental states that don't seem to be susceptible to physical description.
Translation: Every day, Gene_Callahan has experiences for which he cannot identify the necessary and sufficient physical correlates.
I agree, and the term for that is "a failing". I have the same. But the fact that it *seems* a certain way is a property of your map, not the territory.
Can you point me to some observable that indicates this mysterious 'physical world', existing apart from everything mental, is real? ...
Whatever distinction you're making, I'm not interested in, and I don't need to be. What I care about is how this real-or-not-real stuff works.
And btw, why did you decide to go into full anti-reductionism-debate mode just because I pointed out things reductionism doesn't say? I mean, fine with me, but ... are there just not enough other opportunities on the internet to argue this stuff? ;-)
But it does correspond to a constraint on particle motions down to the lowest levels (actually, amplitude distributions if you want to be precise, but whatever), i.e. there is a set of particle motions you identify as love, as close to love, etc, even if you can't personally spell out the entire set of these particle motions. The love exists -- as such a set -- which also (through mechanisms not yet completely understood) generates your subjective experiences.
In the same way, when I identify a substance as being 50 degrees F, I am identifying a set of microstates it can be in that are consistent with the observation of its temperature.
As for the ... interesting reductio you made about scientific insight: yes, any understanding you have corresponds to a model represented by your brain. So? (Btw, this theory isn't dragging "me" anywhere; I didn't come up with it, and I'm not its sole defender.)
Every single day, I observe myself having all sorts of mental states that don't seem to be susceptible to physical description.
Translation: Every day, Gene_Callahan has experiences for which he cannot identify the necessary and sufficient physical correlates.
I agree, and the term for that is "a failing". I have the same. But the fact that it *seems* a certain way is a property of your map, not the territory.
Can you point me to some observable that indicates this mysterious 'physical world', existing apart from everything mental, is real? ...
Whatever distinction you're making, I'm not interested in, and I don't need to be. What I care about is how this real-or-not-real stuff works.
And btw, why did you decide to go into full anti-reductionism-debate mode just because I pointed out things reductionism doesn't say? I mean, fine with me, but ... are there just not enough other opportunities on the internet to argue this stuff? ;-)
@Lucas: Two points:
1) It's not that love *causes* you to care for your wife; it's that love *is* the (physical correlates of the) mental states and actions consistent with a certain kind of caring for your wife.
2) You seem to be using the term "mind" to mean "consciousness" which is not quite the same thing.
1) It's not that love *causes* you to care for your wife; it's that love *is* the (physical correlates of the) mental states and actions consistent with a certain kind of caring for your wife.
2) You seem to be using the term "mind" to mean "consciousness" which is not quite the same thing.
'Translation: Every day, Gene_Callahan has experiences for which he cannot identify the necessary and sufficient physical correlates.
'I agree, and the term for that is "a failing".'
But Silas, don't you see that merely correlating to some physical state in no way gets us reductionism. It doesn't even tell us what direction causation (if any!) runs in. To get reductionism, love has to be "nothing but" a particular kind of physical state. And here is where the rub, for you, comes in: just so, "ideas" "about physics" in this view, are not really ideas about physics at all, but merely a "model" of certain patterns of brain states you frequently have. And even the idea of "a brain" is not really about anything other than... well, at this point, the hardcore reductionists head should start to reel... and this is pretty much why I don't encounter this view amongst the professional philosophers I encounter: it was tried, and it was seen to lead to insurmountable difficulties. Amongst materialists, the idea of real layers, e.g., thoughts are real and not just sets of brain states, even though they depend upon brains to emerge -- and not just layers in our models -- has become much more popular than hard-core reductionism, because the latter just couldn't be worked out coherently.
'I agree, and the term for that is "a failing".'
But Silas, don't you see that merely correlating to some physical state in no way gets us reductionism. It doesn't even tell us what direction causation (if any!) runs in. To get reductionism, love has to be "nothing but" a particular kind of physical state. And here is where the rub, for you, comes in: just so, "ideas" "about physics" in this view, are not really ideas about physics at all, but merely a "model" of certain patterns of brain states you frequently have. And even the idea of "a brain" is not really about anything other than... well, at this point, the hardcore reductionists head should start to reel... and this is pretty much why I don't encounter this view amongst the professional philosophers I encounter: it was tried, and it was seen to lead to insurmountable difficulties. Amongst materialists, the idea of real layers, e.g., thoughts are real and not just sets of brain states, even though they depend upon brains to emerge -- and not just layers in our models -- has become much more popular than hard-core reductionism, because the latter just couldn't be worked out coherently.
"nd btw, why did you decide to go into full anti-reductionism-debate mode just because I pointed out things reductionism doesn't say? I mean, fine with me, but ... are there just not enough other opportunities on the internet to argue this stuff? ;-)"
Gotta defend the home turf first,man.
Gotta defend the home turf first,man.
But Silas, don't you see that merely correlating to some physical state in no way gets us reductionism.
It's not supposed to "get us" reductionism; it's supposed to show how reductionism classifies the "irreducible" states you claim exist.
It doesn't even tell us what direction causation (if any!) runs in.
I'm not sure what relationship the issue of causation has to do with the specific exchange we were having, but nevertheless:
Correct, correlation doesn't guarantee causation. (Now, who said Gene_Callahan doesn't have a good grasp of statistics?) And of course, this correlation is not what's cited as the proof of anything's causation. What would prove that A is *the* cause of B would be evidence B is conditionally independent of previous events given A, and A is the minimal set of factors for which this is true. See the work of Judea Pearl, starting from here. (Metaphorically, A "screens off" the influence of other factors from B.)
To get reductionism, love has to be "nothing but" a particular kind of physical state.And here is where the rub, for you, comes in: just so, "ideas" "about physics" in this view, are not really ideas about physics at all, but merely a "model" of certain patterns of brain states you frequently have.
To the extent that my only access to the world is through sense organs and inferences therefrom, yes, scientific ideas are ultimately specifying what future perceptions I will have. But this is an issue all models, theories, and philosophies face; it's not something unique to reductionism. In any case, if the simplest correct scientific idea I have requires that I assume some dynamic going on in the physical world, plus some dynamic that converts occurrences there into my perception, that most certainly counts as an idea "about physics", and in no way contradicts the fact that it has a brain state as a correlate.
So to clarify for me: Please show the premises you believe reductionism requires, and where they are inconsistent.
Amongst materialists, the idea of real layers, e.g., thoughts are real and not just sets of brain states, even though they depend upon brains to emerge -- and not just layers in our models -- has become much more popular than hard-core reductionism, because the latter just couldn't be worked out coherently.
Oh, REALLY? Professional, "serious" philosophers haven't figured out how to make reductionism work out coherently? So, a field that hasn't produced practical results applicable to real-world problems (such as accumulating enough research and understanding in a field to launch a new science no longer grouped with philosophy) in some fifty years, also can't wrap its collective mind around reductionism? Ah, well, I guess that settles it...
How about this: reductionist scientists and engineers will continue expanding the set of things that are possible, and anti-reductionist philosophers can keep proving why the next breakthrough won't happen, and giving each other awards. Sound good?
It's not supposed to "get us" reductionism; it's supposed to show how reductionism classifies the "irreducible" states you claim exist.
It doesn't even tell us what direction causation (if any!) runs in.
I'm not sure what relationship the issue of causation has to do with the specific exchange we were having, but nevertheless:
Correct, correlation doesn't guarantee causation. (Now, who said Gene_Callahan doesn't have a good grasp of statistics?) And of course, this correlation is not what's cited as the proof of anything's causation. What would prove that A is *the* cause of B would be evidence B is conditionally independent of previous events given A, and A is the minimal set of factors for which this is true. See the work of Judea Pearl, starting from here. (Metaphorically, A "screens off" the influence of other factors from B.)
To get reductionism, love has to be "nothing but" a particular kind of physical state.And here is where the rub, for you, comes in: just so, "ideas" "about physics" in this view, are not really ideas about physics at all, but merely a "model" of certain patterns of brain states you frequently have.
To the extent that my only access to the world is through sense organs and inferences therefrom, yes, scientific ideas are ultimately specifying what future perceptions I will have. But this is an issue all models, theories, and philosophies face; it's not something unique to reductionism. In any case, if the simplest correct scientific idea I have requires that I assume some dynamic going on in the physical world, plus some dynamic that converts occurrences there into my perception, that most certainly counts as an idea "about physics", and in no way contradicts the fact that it has a brain state as a correlate.
So to clarify for me: Please show the premises you believe reductionism requires, and where they are inconsistent.
Amongst materialists, the idea of real layers, e.g., thoughts are real and not just sets of brain states, even though they depend upon brains to emerge -- and not just layers in our models -- has become much more popular than hard-core reductionism, because the latter just couldn't be worked out coherently.
Oh, REALLY? Professional, "serious" philosophers haven't figured out how to make reductionism work out coherently? So, a field that hasn't produced practical results applicable to real-world problems (such as accumulating enough research and understanding in a field to launch a new science no longer grouped with philosophy) in some fifty years, also can't wrap its collective mind around reductionism? Ah, well, I guess that settles it...
How about this: reductionist scientists and engineers will continue expanding the set of things that are possible, and anti-reductionist philosophers can keep proving why the next breakthrough won't happen, and giving each other awards. Sound good?
A few quick points and then I think I have to quit this one...
Silas: You're right, I was sloppy with saying, "You guys expect me to point to something physical to prove..."
TT and Silas: I am not (here) trying to argue about whether the mind causes brain states, vice versa, or mutual determination. I've explained my take on the mind-body problem elsewhere. Obviously if one is an atheist (not sure what Silas' views are), then my solution isn't very appealing.
But here, I want to make the very modest claims that (a) IDEAS EXIST, and that (b) IDEAS ARE NOT PHYSICAL THINGS. Tom has already conceded (a), because he said (correctly in my view) that the Pythogorean Theorem is an idea.
OK great, so now the only question is, "Are ideas physical things?"
I say no, they are not. You can certainly represent an idea in a physical form. E.g. you can write out the theorem on a piece of paper, or you can store it as a bunch of electric charges in a computer (I think?) etc. It can also be stored in someone's brain as an arrangement of neurons (or whatever).
But what does it mean to say "those are all instantiations of, or representations of, or encodings of, the Pythagorean theorem?" It shows that the theorem itself is not a physical thing, since "the same theorem" can be represented in all those different media. So what is it that all those different, physical media share in common? Why, they are all representing the same idea, which is itself a non-physical thing.
This is really a very very basic and modest point. Remember Tom, I used to be a hardcore materialist. I thought that ideas didn't really exist the way electrons (probably) did. After all, something vague like an theorem (or a fictional character like Sherlock Holmes) wasn't as real and scientific as quarks.
OK that's fine if you want to think that. I don't want to argue that right now. All I am saying is that ideas do exist, and they are not physical things.
And so when someone looks at a brain and says, "That is thought, mind is a physical thing," he is speaking nonsense. That's not something we can go test to see if he's right or wrong; it is simple nonsense showing that he is using the words "thought" and "mind" differently from how everyone else uses those words.
Even if it's true that the brain produces thought, still, the brain is different from thought.
Suppose an auto mechanic opened the hood and said, "Wow, it blows my mind, I am looking at road trip. Amazing."
Do you see how nonsensical that would be? And if I pointed it out, you wouldn't need to start arguing engineering and fuel combustion with me. The point is, the engine is not the same thing as a road trip. Just like the brain is not the same thing as thought.
Silas: You're right, I was sloppy with saying, "You guys expect me to point to something physical to prove..."
TT and Silas: I am not (here) trying to argue about whether the mind causes brain states, vice versa, or mutual determination. I've explained my take on the mind-body problem elsewhere. Obviously if one is an atheist (not sure what Silas' views are), then my solution isn't very appealing.
But here, I want to make the very modest claims that (a) IDEAS EXIST, and that (b) IDEAS ARE NOT PHYSICAL THINGS. Tom has already conceded (a), because he said (correctly in my view) that the Pythogorean Theorem is an idea.
OK great, so now the only question is, "Are ideas physical things?"
I say no, they are not. You can certainly represent an idea in a physical form. E.g. you can write out the theorem on a piece of paper, or you can store it as a bunch of electric charges in a computer (I think?) etc. It can also be stored in someone's brain as an arrangement of neurons (or whatever).
But what does it mean to say "those are all instantiations of, or representations of, or encodings of, the Pythagorean theorem?" It shows that the theorem itself is not a physical thing, since "the same theorem" can be represented in all those different media. So what is it that all those different, physical media share in common? Why, they are all representing the same idea, which is itself a non-physical thing.
This is really a very very basic and modest point. Remember Tom, I used to be a hardcore materialist. I thought that ideas didn't really exist the way electrons (probably) did. After all, something vague like an theorem (or a fictional character like Sherlock Holmes) wasn't as real and scientific as quarks.
OK that's fine if you want to think that. I don't want to argue that right now. All I am saying is that ideas do exist, and they are not physical things.
And so when someone looks at a brain and says, "That is thought, mind is a physical thing," he is speaking nonsense. That's not something we can go test to see if he's right or wrong; it is simple nonsense showing that he is using the words "thought" and "mind" differently from how everyone else uses those words.
Even if it's true that the brain produces thought, still, the brain is different from thought.
Suppose an auto mechanic opened the hood and said, "Wow, it blows my mind, I am looking at road trip. Amazing."
Do you see how nonsensical that would be? And if I pointed it out, you wouldn't need to start arguing engineering and fuel combustion with me. The point is, the engine is not the same thing as a road trip. Just like the brain is not the same thing as thought.
"The point is, the engine is not the same thing as a road trip. Just like the brain is not the same thing as thought."
Yes, as the (materialist and atheist) philosopher Donald Davidson said, someone who tries to reduce thoughts to brain states is not explaining anything, they are changing the subject.
"and then I think I have to quit this one..."
Yes, when one's opponent in a debate forwards a philosophical position, and then, unable to defend it philosophically, repliess, "Ha-ha, but philosophy sucks anyway, because philosophers don't make advances in science and engineering," then it, indeed, time to quit.
Yes, as the (materialist and atheist) philosopher Donald Davidson said, someone who tries to reduce thoughts to brain states is not explaining anything, they are changing the subject.
"and then I think I have to quit this one..."
Yes, when one's opponent in a debate forwards a philosophical position, and then, unable to defend it philosophically, repliess, "Ha-ha, but philosophy sucks anyway, because philosophers don't make advances in science and engineering," then it, indeed, time to quit.
@Bob: You're right, I was sloppy with saying, "You guys expect me to point to something physical to prove..."
Thanks! I hope you continue this trend of recognizing when you horribly distort others' arguments!
But what does it mean to say "those are all instantiations of, or representations of, or encodings of, the Pythagorean theorem?" It shows that the theorem itself is not a physical thing, since "the same theorem" can be represented in all those different media. So what is it that all those different, physical media share in common? Why, they are all representing the same idea, which is itself a non-physical thing.
Right, but that's different from saying that there are some unobservable aspects to it, which is where you seemed to be going. And note that everything you said here can be said of waves. Waves are non-physical in that there's no one object you can point to and say, "ah, that thing is the wave". A wave is a *relationship* that holds across space and time. It can be instantiated in different media. But when that happens, we're merely saying that "this relationship {...} persists among your observations". That is, there are still things you can point to to show whether they exist, a challenge you seemed to be dodging.
But here, I want to make the very modest claims that (a) IDEAS EXIST, and that (b) IDEAS ARE NOT PHYSICAL THINGS. ... This is really a very very basic and modest point. ... I used to be a hardcore materialist. I thought that ideas didn't really exist the way electrons (probably) did. After all, something vague like an theorem (or a fictional character like Sherlock Holmes) wasn't as real and scientific as quarks.
This just shows confusion you had over the terms "real", "exist", and "things", which suggests that whatever reason you had for dropping reductionsim wasn't very good. Sherlock Holmes certainly exists as a regularity across your observations: i.e., you expect that when others discuss Sherlock Holmes, they will talk about him in a way consistent with him being a detective, who made clever deductions, who isn't an actual human in our society, etc. In the same way, electrons exist as a regularity across our observations, which is why scientists assume their existence when creating models: because they expect the world (based on previous observation) to behave a certain way.
In the case of the doctor, I think he was just expressing amazement at how the brains he looks at *implement* the amazing properties of mind. In the same way, an engine is not a road trip, but there's nothing wrong with saying, "Wow, I am looking at the critical piece of a road trip [for this specific group of people]!"
@Gene:
Yes, when one's opponent in a debate forwards a philosophical position, and then, unable to defend it philosophically, repliess, "Ha-ha, but philosophy sucks anyway, because philosophers don't make advances in science and engineering," then it, indeed, time to quit.
Give me a break. First of all, I was able to defend it philosophically; the failure of most (not all) existing philosophers to demonstrate the usefulness of their work to anyone not part of the clique is just icing on the cake. Second, if you look at what I actually wrote(!), I wasn't criticizing "philosophy", but rather, a school of philosophical thought (that which is incapable of seeing how to consistently apply reductionism). I certainly do admire the work of the philosopher Gary Drescher, but I guess he doesn't count because he's not part of the kewl kidz club.
as the (materialist and atheist) philosopher Donald Davidson said, someone who tries to reduce thoughts to brain states is not explaining anything, they are changing the subject.
Just like when someone tries to reduce bird flight to aerodynamic lift, they are changing the subject. We're talking about *birds*, man. Like ,the true Platonic *essence* of the bird. None of this "air" stuff.
Thanks! I hope you continue this trend of recognizing when you horribly distort others' arguments!
But what does it mean to say "those are all instantiations of, or representations of, or encodings of, the Pythagorean theorem?" It shows that the theorem itself is not a physical thing, since "the same theorem" can be represented in all those different media. So what is it that all those different, physical media share in common? Why, they are all representing the same idea, which is itself a non-physical thing.
Right, but that's different from saying that there are some unobservable aspects to it, which is where you seemed to be going. And note that everything you said here can be said of waves. Waves are non-physical in that there's no one object you can point to and say, "ah, that thing is the wave". A wave is a *relationship* that holds across space and time. It can be instantiated in different media. But when that happens, we're merely saying that "this relationship {...} persists among your observations". That is, there are still things you can point to to show whether they exist, a challenge you seemed to be dodging.
But here, I want to make the very modest claims that (a) IDEAS EXIST, and that (b) IDEAS ARE NOT PHYSICAL THINGS. ... This is really a very very basic and modest point. ... I used to be a hardcore materialist. I thought that ideas didn't really exist the way electrons (probably) did. After all, something vague like an theorem (or a fictional character like Sherlock Holmes) wasn't as real and scientific as quarks.
This just shows confusion you had over the terms "real", "exist", and "things", which suggests that whatever reason you had for dropping reductionsim wasn't very good. Sherlock Holmes certainly exists as a regularity across your observations: i.e., you expect that when others discuss Sherlock Holmes, they will talk about him in a way consistent with him being a detective, who made clever deductions, who isn't an actual human in our society, etc. In the same way, electrons exist as a regularity across our observations, which is why scientists assume their existence when creating models: because they expect the world (based on previous observation) to behave a certain way.
In the case of the doctor, I think he was just expressing amazement at how the brains he looks at *implement* the amazing properties of mind. In the same way, an engine is not a road trip, but there's nothing wrong with saying, "Wow, I am looking at the critical piece of a road trip [for this specific group of people]!"
@Gene:
Yes, when one's opponent in a debate forwards a philosophical position, and then, unable to defend it philosophically, repliess, "Ha-ha, but philosophy sucks anyway, because philosophers don't make advances in science and engineering," then it, indeed, time to quit.
Give me a break. First of all, I was able to defend it philosophically; the failure of most (not all) existing philosophers to demonstrate the usefulness of their work to anyone not part of the clique is just icing on the cake. Second, if you look at what I actually wrote(!), I wasn't criticizing "philosophy", but rather, a school of philosophical thought (that which is incapable of seeing how to consistently apply reductionism). I certainly do admire the work of the philosopher Gary Drescher, but I guess he doesn't count because he's not part of the kewl kidz club.
as the (materialist and atheist) philosopher Donald Davidson said, someone who tries to reduce thoughts to brain states is not explaining anything, they are changing the subject.
Just like when someone tries to reduce bird flight to aerodynamic lift, they are changing the subject. We're talking about *birds*, man. Like ,the true Platonic *essence* of the bird. None of this "air" stuff.
"First of all, I was able to defend it philosophically;"
No; as soon as I brought up the logical incoherence of reductionsim, you started into "Oh, I don't care about that crap."
"the failure of most (not all) existing philosophers to demonstrate the usefulness of their work to anyone not part of the clique is just icing on the cake."
Usefulness?! Of what sort of "use" is reductionism? Not a single finding in all of science or engineering depends on the truth of reductionism -- and given that its incoherent, good thing!
No; as soon as I brought up the logical incoherence of reductionsim, you started into "Oh, I don't care about that crap."
"the failure of most (not all) existing philosophers to demonstrate the usefulness of their work to anyone not part of the clique is just icing on the cake."
Usefulness?! Of what sort of "use" is reductionism? Not a single finding in all of science or engineering depends on the truth of reductionism -- and given that its incoherent, good thing!
Let us try to clarify something, Silas. You seem to be asserting that it only makes sense to assert the truth of something when that truth has an observable test that can be applied to it. Is that so?
as soon as I brought up the logical incoherence of reductionsim, you started into "Oh, I don't care about that crap."
No, Gene, please refer back to the context:
You: Can you point me to some observable that indicates this mysterious 'physical world', existing apart from everything mental, is real? ...
Me: Whatever distinction you're making, I'm not interested in, and I don't need to be. What I care about is how this real-or-not-real stuff works.
It is an outright lie to say that I responded to you by saying that I didn't care about the incoherence of reductionism, or some supporting claim to that effect. What was happening was that you were attempting to show shortcomings of reductionism by asking what observations show that a physical non-mental world is real. My response -- as would be appropriate -- was to state that this abstract distinction about this or that being "real" is not important. The reductionist's concern is with how "that that we observe" works, whether or not it counts as "real" or "physical" by whatever definition you insist on using for "real" and "physical".
Taking such a position does not imply incoherence, just because it obviates ambiguous distinctions you feel are necessary.
And please stop misquoting me.
Usefulness?! Of what sort of "use" is reductionism? Not a single finding in all of science or engineering depends on the truth of reductionism
Where do you get that? Such findings were certainly accelerated by a commitment to reductionism insofar as it mattered to that particular field.
For example, efforts toward human flight were predicated on the possibility of reducing flight to is constituent components, as opposed to taking the view that there's some ontologically distinct dynamic that accounts for flight. The invention of computers was predicated on the possibility of reducing the mental process of addition into non-mental processes that can be instantiated in non-biological media (by whatever non-human definition of "computer" you use).
Had someone simply said, "Oh, addition is something only humans can do" -- as is often said of "intelligence" or "understanding" or "emotion" by antireductionists today -- they wouldn't have been able to build a computer.
But I don't know what else I can say to refute such a vague assertion.
No, Gene, please refer back to the context:
You: Can you point me to some observable that indicates this mysterious 'physical world', existing apart from everything mental, is real? ...
Me: Whatever distinction you're making, I'm not interested in, and I don't need to be. What I care about is how this real-or-not-real stuff works.
It is an outright lie to say that I responded to you by saying that I didn't care about the incoherence of reductionism, or some supporting claim to that effect. What was happening was that you were attempting to show shortcomings of reductionism by asking what observations show that a physical non-mental world is real. My response -- as would be appropriate -- was to state that this abstract distinction about this or that being "real" is not important. The reductionist's concern is with how "that that we observe" works, whether or not it counts as "real" or "physical" by whatever definition you insist on using for "real" and "physical".
Taking such a position does not imply incoherence, just because it obviates ambiguous distinctions you feel are necessary.
And please stop misquoting me.
Usefulness?! Of what sort of "use" is reductionism? Not a single finding in all of science or engineering depends on the truth of reductionism
Where do you get that? Such findings were certainly accelerated by a commitment to reductionism insofar as it mattered to that particular field.
For example, efforts toward human flight were predicated on the possibility of reducing flight to is constituent components, as opposed to taking the view that there's some ontologically distinct dynamic that accounts for flight. The invention of computers was predicated on the possibility of reducing the mental process of addition into non-mental processes that can be instantiated in non-biological media (by whatever non-human definition of "computer" you use).
Had someone simply said, "Oh, addition is something only humans can do" -- as is often said of "intelligence" or "understanding" or "emotion" by antireductionists today -- they wouldn't have been able to build a computer.
But I don't know what else I can say to refute such a vague assertion.
@Gene_Callahan: If you're trying to make another cutesy reductio that involves reductionism's failure to handle "purely logical truths", I already addressed that in my response to Andrew_Smith above. Please read that comment.
"Just like when someone tries to reduce bird flight to aerodynamic lift, they are changing the subject. We're talking about *birds*, man."
You're joking, right? Because you do realize that aerodynamics and ornithology are different subjects, right?
You're joking, right? Because you do realize that aerodynamics and ornithology are different subjects, right?
'If you're trying to make another cutesy reductio that involves reductionism's failure to handle "purely logical truths"'
Yeah, I mentioned those. Now, do you assert that all meaningful statements either:
1) Have a truth value that hinges on something observable; or
2) Are purely logical truths; or
3) Are essentially without truth value?
Yeah, I mentioned those. Now, do you assert that all meaningful statements either:
1) Have a truth value that hinges on something observable; or
2) Are purely logical truths; or
3) Are essentially without truth value?
"For example, efforts toward human flight were predicated on the possibility of reducing flight to is constituent components, as opposed to taking the view that there's some ontologically distinct dynamic that accounts for flight..."
Yes, so the fact that reduction works in some engineering cases PROVES the metaphysical doctrine of materialist reductionism, does it?
Yes, so the fact that reduction works in some engineering cases PROVES the metaphysical doctrine of materialist reductionism, does it?
You're joking, right? Because you do realize that aerodynamics and ornithology are different subjects, right?
*epic facepalm*
Gene, if you count "explaining bird flight through aerodynamics" as "changing the subject" (from ornithology to aerodynamics), then I no longer see what's wrong with "changing the subject" in response to a challenge, as you seem to be using the term, like when you said:
"someone who tries to reduce thoughts to brain states is not explaining anything, they are changing the subject."
In the case of birdflight, "changing the subject" to how the wing of bird interacts with the air to generate lift is *exactly what your should do*!
Btw, Gene, I'm interested in any response you have to what I said on your Life Force post.
*epic facepalm*
Gene, if you count "explaining bird flight through aerodynamics" as "changing the subject" (from ornithology to aerodynamics), then I no longer see what's wrong with "changing the subject" in response to a challenge, as you seem to be using the term, like when you said:
"someone who tries to reduce thoughts to brain states is not explaining anything, they are changing the subject."
In the case of birdflight, "changing the subject" to how the wing of bird interacts with the air to generate lift is *exactly what your should do*!
Btw, Gene, I'm interested in any response you have to what I said on your Life Force post.
Re: logical truths, again, please read my response to Andrew_Smith; I don't yet see evidence you have done so.
Yes, so the fact that reduction works in some engineering cases PROVES the metaphysical doctrine of materialist reductionism, does it?
I defined what variant of reductionism I was defending. I explained the benefits of that reductionism. You claimed that wasn't such a benefit. Now you admit that adherence to reductionism did have a benefit in a few contexts. Now you want to switch back to some broader claim when referring to "reductionism".
Sorry, I'm only defending the variant of reductionism I described before. And you've agreed that you were in error to say that engineering advances "didn't depend" on reductionism, since acceleration of their occurrence is certainly a kind of dependence.
Yes, so the fact that reduction works in some engineering cases PROVES the metaphysical doctrine of materialist reductionism, does it?
I defined what variant of reductionism I was defending. I explained the benefits of that reductionism. You claimed that wasn't such a benefit. Now you admit that adherence to reductionism did have a benefit in a few contexts. Now you want to switch back to some broader claim when referring to "reductionism".
Sorry, I'm only defending the variant of reductionism I described before. And you've agreed that you were in error to say that engineering advances "didn't depend" on reductionism, since acceleration of their occurrence is certainly a kind of dependence.
"I explained the benefits of that reductionism. You claimed that wasn't such a benefit. Now you admit that adherence to reductionism did have a benefit in a few contexts."
No one, anywhere, ever, as far as I know, has ever claimed that nothing can ever be usefully broken down to its parts. The fact that some things can says nothing whatsoever about the truth of metaphysical materialist reductionist, just like the fact that some physical difficulties are well-treated with smelling salts says nothing about a theory that claims smelling salts are the cure for any ailment.
No one, anywhere, ever, as far as I know, has ever claimed that nothing can ever be usefully broken down to its parts. The fact that some things can says nothing whatsoever about the truth of metaphysical materialist reductionist, just like the fact that some physical difficulties are well-treated with smelling salts says nothing about a theory that claims smelling salts are the cure for any ailment.
Yes, very nice response to Andrew. Now, do you or don't you ascribe to the view that all meaningful statements either:
1) Have a truth value that hinges on something observable; or
2) Are purely logical truths (which may be ascribed to the motion of particles somehow); or
3) Are essentially without truth value?
It's just a 'yes' or 'no' question, Silas -- is this what you argue, or isn't it?
1) Have a truth value that hinges on something observable; or
2) Are purely logical truths (which may be ascribed to the motion of particles somehow); or
3) Are essentially without truth value?
It's just a 'yes' or 'no' question, Silas -- is this what you argue, or isn't it?
@Gene_Callahan: How about, just for kicks, telling me what *you* mean by reductionism, and how it relates to what I have been arguing in favor of, so I know what I'm responding to you when you claim that e.g. reductionism has been useless.
Yes, very nice response to Andrew. ... It's just a 'yes' or 'no' question, Silas -- is this what you argue, or isn't it?
LOL! You're kidding, right? The resident philosophy expert demanding that I give a yes or no answer? You can't make this stuff up.
Anyway, I'm still not convinced you read my response to Andrew_Smith. I clearly explained the status of logical truths. Did you not understand it? I clearly explained that logical truths do in fact correspond to (anticipated) regularities of observation. Let's go over this again:
-Given a set of rules and a procedure for using them, other people are more likely to come to the same answer as you, compared to a random guess. The same holds true if you replace the other person with "a mechanism isomorphic to the rules of logic" that is interpreted according to that isomorphism. That is an observed regularity.
-Verification of logical truths can be implemented in a thermodynamically reversible manner (aka without degradation of energy aka without decrease in the KL Divergence of the energy source from its environment), and no others. Again, this is an observable regularity.
-Certain axiom sets play a role in compressing our description of our observations -- that is, if you work from math from a certain axiom set, you will, in many cases, be able to give shorter descriptions. Again, the use of math within a model may not be completely accurate, but it will improve the accuracy beyond what you get from random guesses. Again, an observed regularity.
I can go on, but logical truths are not a separate class: they do have implications for what we expect to observe.
Yes, very nice response to Andrew. ... It's just a 'yes' or 'no' question, Silas -- is this what you argue, or isn't it?
LOL! You're kidding, right? The resident philosophy expert demanding that I give a yes or no answer? You can't make this stuff up.
Anyway, I'm still not convinced you read my response to Andrew_Smith. I clearly explained the status of logical truths. Did you not understand it? I clearly explained that logical truths do in fact correspond to (anticipated) regularities of observation. Let's go over this again:
-Given a set of rules and a procedure for using them, other people are more likely to come to the same answer as you, compared to a random guess. The same holds true if you replace the other person with "a mechanism isomorphic to the rules of logic" that is interpreted according to that isomorphism. That is an observed regularity.
-Verification of logical truths can be implemented in a thermodynamically reversible manner (aka without degradation of energy aka without decrease in the KL Divergence of the energy source from its environment), and no others. Again, this is an observable regularity.
-Certain axiom sets play a role in compressing our description of our observations -- that is, if you work from math from a certain axiom set, you will, in many cases, be able to give shorter descriptions. Again, the use of math within a model may not be completely accurate, but it will improve the accuracy beyond what you get from random guesses. Again, an observed regularity.
I can go on, but logical truths are not a separate class: they do have implications for what we expect to observe.
Bob, sorry, but I do not agree that ideas "exist", at least not independently of the minds that think them or record them. There is a physical universe that has real structure that we have made great strides in understanding, and THAT structure exists, whether or not we accurately perceive it or describe it.
Discussion of the "mind", while certainly more useful at present than materialistic descriptions in explaining intentional human activity, have very little utility when discussing subconscious or unconscious behavior or the behavior of non-humans, and have much reduced utility when discussing the behavior of those who suffer from mental defects/brain damages.
Aren't those who fail to acknowledge the bounds of the usefulness of using "the mind" to describe behavior while charging "materialsts" with changing the subject committing the very offense they level at materialists?
Discussion of the "mind", while certainly more useful at present than materialistic descriptions in explaining intentional human activity, have very little utility when discussing subconscious or unconscious behavior or the behavior of non-humans, and have much reduced utility when discussing the behavior of those who suffer from mental defects/brain damages.
Aren't those who fail to acknowledge the bounds of the usefulness of using "the mind" to describe behavior while charging "materialsts" with changing the subject committing the very offense they level at materialists?
Very nice, Silas. Now do you or don't you hold that:
Now, do you or don't you ascribe to the view that all meaningful statements either:
1) Have a truth value that hinges on something observable (which includes what are usually thought of as purely logical truths); or
2) Are essentially without truth value?
Silas, even philosophy has 'yes' or 'no' questions. Either you do hold the above, or you don't. (And moving 2) into 1) doesn't really change anything. Before you could have answered, 'yes', but 2)) is part of 1).)
Now, do you or don't you ascribe to the view that all meaningful statements either:
1) Have a truth value that hinges on something observable (which includes what are usually thought of as purely logical truths); or
2) Are essentially without truth value?
Silas, even philosophy has 'yes' or 'no' questions. Either you do hold the above, or you don't. (And moving 2) into 1) doesn't really change anything. Before you could have answered, 'yes', but 2)) is part of 1).)
TokyoTom wrote:
Bob, sorry, but I do not agree that ideas "exist", at least not independently of the minds that think them or record them.
Tom, do babies exist?
Bob, sorry, but I do not agree that ideas "exist", at least not independently of the minds that think them or record them.
Tom, do babies exist?
@Gene_Callahan: Yes, I could have said (2) is part of (1), just as you could have read my explanation the first time so you didn't have to ask, and then could have actually spend some of your last 3-4 comments actually making an actual point instead of telling me that you a) don't read my posts, and b) decided that in my case only (and probably because you realize you're backed into a corner), philosophical questions suddenly become black and white and require absolute yes/no answers to.
My gray answer is that your characterization sounds right, but it depends on how you're using "truth value", which is why absolute yes/no is typically avoided.
My gray answer is that your characterization sounds right, but it depends on how you're using "truth value", which is why absolute yes/no is typically avoided.
Actually don't bother answering Tom, I realized what you are going to say to get out of my trap.
In this post, I am not arguing that ideas are more fundamental than physical objects. (I think I could argue that quite well, since after all the existence of the physical universe is a hypothesis that does a great job explaining and predicting our subjective experiences. But we don't need to go there in this post.)
I am making the extremely basic claim that brain and mind are different things.
Tom, if I heard my car mechanic point at an engine and say, "Wow, that's road trip. Road trip is an engine. It blows my mind," would you object if I blogged here that my mechanic was speaking nonsense?
If you want to say, "What the neurosurgeon meant was that brain configurations give rise to phenomena that we have elsewhere described as 'mind,'" then fine I would not have accused him of a crude fallacy.
I can't believe you won't even admit that ideas exist without hemming and hawing. Yes, they do exist. You don't need to add a caveat. All I am saying is that they exist. You agree, they exist.
Good, my work is done here.
In this post, I am not arguing that ideas are more fundamental than physical objects. (I think I could argue that quite well, since after all the existence of the physical universe is a hypothesis that does a great job explaining and predicting our subjective experiences. But we don't need to go there in this post.)
I am making the extremely basic claim that brain and mind are different things.
Tom, if I heard my car mechanic point at an engine and say, "Wow, that's road trip. Road trip is an engine. It blows my mind," would you object if I blogged here that my mechanic was speaking nonsense?
If you want to say, "What the neurosurgeon meant was that brain configurations give rise to phenomena that we have elsewhere described as 'mind,'" then fine I would not have accused him of a crude fallacy.
I can't believe you won't even admit that ideas exist without hemming and hawing. Yes, they do exist. You don't need to add a caveat. All I am saying is that they exist. You agree, they exist.
Good, my work is done here.
"Yes, I could have said (2) is part of (1), just as you could have read my explanation the first time so you didn't have to ask..."
Stupid. 2) being part of 1) does not change the answer to my question. You could have just answered yes in the first place.
But, good, you think it is only meaningful to speak of the truth of statements that have observable consequences.
Now, your post about the philosophical "kewl kidz" (nice juvenile spelling, btw) was just dumb-assed, because, as a follower of Green, Bosanquet, Bradley, Collingwood and Oakeshott, I'm about as far from being amongst the "kewl kidz", or a slavish fan of theirs, as possible. But, unlike you, I do try to keep abreast with mainstream philosophy as much as possible. And there have been very significant findings in the field.
One of them is that logical positivism, the name for the doctrine that only statements about observables have truth value, has been utterly vanquished from philosophy, and a key reason is that it became clear that it was self-contradictory, since the proposition that only statements with observable consequences have truth values does not have observalbe consequences! This realization (along with the fact that logical positivism described the actual practice of actual scientists very badly) led one of its leading lights, A. J. Ayer, later in life, when asked what the problem with logical posivitism was, replied "Well, I suppose the main problem was that it was almost entirely wrong."
Another advance in mainstream philosophy is that the "event regularity" view of science is coming to be seen as the naive nonsense that it is. Almost no scientists subscribe to this view, and today, thankfully, few philosophers do.
So, congratulations, Silas: You hold to logically incoherent and discredited philosophical doctrines, a lot like if you were a biologist stuck to a thoery of "vital force." Now, I realize that this is because you don't pay any attention to philosophy and don't spend any time thinking about it -- you ran across these ideas once in the past, adopted them like a religious creed, and that was that. And that's fine. But it is really annoying the way you drip scorn upon people who spend their life thinking about and reading philosophy when they mention there are problems with these ideas.
Oh, yeah, and:
"And please stop misquoting me."
Is it possible that for one minute you could not be a total moron? Anyone with any sense would realize that I was paraphrasing your position, not "quoting" you. This is done all the time, and its a standard trope, OK?
Now, go get started in your second book on philosophy, and check in again when you are done.
Stupid. 2) being part of 1) does not change the answer to my question. You could have just answered yes in the first place.
But, good, you think it is only meaningful to speak of the truth of statements that have observable consequences.
Now, your post about the philosophical "kewl kidz" (nice juvenile spelling, btw) was just dumb-assed, because, as a follower of Green, Bosanquet, Bradley, Collingwood and Oakeshott, I'm about as far from being amongst the "kewl kidz", or a slavish fan of theirs, as possible. But, unlike you, I do try to keep abreast with mainstream philosophy as much as possible. And there have been very significant findings in the field.
One of them is that logical positivism, the name for the doctrine that only statements about observables have truth value, has been utterly vanquished from philosophy, and a key reason is that it became clear that it was self-contradictory, since the proposition that only statements with observable consequences have truth values does not have observalbe consequences! This realization (along with the fact that logical positivism described the actual practice of actual scientists very badly) led one of its leading lights, A. J. Ayer, later in life, when asked what the problem with logical posivitism was, replied "Well, I suppose the main problem was that it was almost entirely wrong."
Another advance in mainstream philosophy is that the "event regularity" view of science is coming to be seen as the naive nonsense that it is. Almost no scientists subscribe to this view, and today, thankfully, few philosophers do.
So, congratulations, Silas: You hold to logically incoherent and discredited philosophical doctrines, a lot like if you were a biologist stuck to a thoery of "vital force." Now, I realize that this is because you don't pay any attention to philosophy and don't spend any time thinking about it -- you ran across these ideas once in the past, adopted them like a religious creed, and that was that. And that's fine. But it is really annoying the way you drip scorn upon people who spend their life thinking about and reading philosophy when they mention there are problems with these ideas.
Oh, yeah, and:
"And please stop misquoting me."
Is it possible that for one minute you could not be a total moron? Anyone with any sense would realize that I was paraphrasing your position, not "quoting" you. This is done all the time, and its a standard trope, OK?
Now, go get started in your second book on philosophy, and check in again when you are done.
So, let's summarize:
- My adherence to unpopular philosophical beliefs must be mistaken because most mainstream philosphers have discarded them, but
- Your adherence to unpopular philosphical beliefs is not mistaken, even though most mainstream philosophers have discarded them.
- Only idiots don't realize that quotes don't actually mean quotations (nor even a remotely accurate paraphrase!), but
- Non-idiots can be ignorant of the point of spelling cool kids as "kewl kidz".
- My ignorance of Oakeshott et al's secret, supercool refutation of the "event regularity" view (that you've probably added subtle assumptions to that I don't endorse) is damning proof of my intellectual naivety, but
- Your ignorance of the correspondence between logical truths and thermodynamically reversible computation and other testable consequences of logical truth (not to mention your ignorance in the other thread of the in-lab genesis of self-replicating material from non-life) is completely consistent with being abreast of the issues relevant to modern philosphy.
You hold to logically incoherent and discredited philosophical doctrines, a lot like if you were a biologist stuck to a thoery of "vital force." Now, I realize that this is because you don't pay any attention to philosophy and don't spend any time thinking about it -- you ran across these ideas once in the past, adopted them like a religious creed, and that was that.
Incorrect -- I disagreed with much of what I'm saying here as recently as maybe four years ago, and it is *because* of reading the works of philosophers that aren't in the list of official clique-endorsed True Philosphers (tm), like Gary Drescher, Judea Pearl, Rodney Brooks, E. T. Jaynes, Jeff Hawkins, Julian Barbour, and Geoffrey Hinton that I changed my mind. You know, people who tackle philosophical problems as a necessary step in accomplishing something actually useful and therefore are capable of a stronger form of proof than "other academics agree with me, so there!".
By the way, I thought you said the vital force was still a good idea because the failure of dem ebil reductionists to produce life from non-life (er, except viruses, which don't count after you move your goalposts) is proof that they're missing out on some separate, nebulous vital force that they prematurely stopped looking for?
As for the supposed self-contradiction: I can see now why my concern about the black/white categorization was justified: you take one definition of "truth value", then smuggle in additional assumptions and apply it differently at the meta-level. My *concern* is with things that affect what I will observe. That's roughly the same as what I take "true" to refer to. Anything not related to observations will never be provable one way or another, so I don't bother trying, and I don't bother drawing inferences from those whose claims can't connect to observations, *especially* if they don't even realize that they can be! (Remember what I said about logical truths ...?)
Yes, you can go on believing things that don't correspond to observations. Be my guest! That's between you and your god (or Perfection, as the case may be). But it will still be useless to me. This position does not self refute, because it doesn't need to settle on an abstract "truth value" as differentiated from what I can expect to observe.
- My adherence to unpopular philosophical beliefs must be mistaken because most mainstream philosphers have discarded them, but
- Your adherence to unpopular philosphical beliefs is not mistaken, even though most mainstream philosophers have discarded them.
- Only idiots don't realize that quotes don't actually mean quotations (nor even a remotely accurate paraphrase!), but
- Non-idiots can be ignorant of the point of spelling cool kids as "kewl kidz".
- My ignorance of Oakeshott et al's secret, supercool refutation of the "event regularity" view (that you've probably added subtle assumptions to that I don't endorse) is damning proof of my intellectual naivety, but
- Your ignorance of the correspondence between logical truths and thermodynamically reversible computation and other testable consequences of logical truth (not to mention your ignorance in the other thread of the in-lab genesis of self-replicating material from non-life) is completely consistent with being abreast of the issues relevant to modern philosphy.
You hold to logically incoherent and discredited philosophical doctrines, a lot like if you were a biologist stuck to a thoery of "vital force." Now, I realize that this is because you don't pay any attention to philosophy and don't spend any time thinking about it -- you ran across these ideas once in the past, adopted them like a religious creed, and that was that.
Incorrect -- I disagreed with much of what I'm saying here as recently as maybe four years ago, and it is *because* of reading the works of philosophers that aren't in the list of official clique-endorsed True Philosphers (tm), like Gary Drescher, Judea Pearl, Rodney Brooks, E. T. Jaynes, Jeff Hawkins, Julian Barbour, and Geoffrey Hinton that I changed my mind. You know, people who tackle philosophical problems as a necessary step in accomplishing something actually useful and therefore are capable of a stronger form of proof than "other academics agree with me, so there!".
By the way, I thought you said the vital force was still a good idea because the failure of dem ebil reductionists to produce life from non-life (er, except viruses, which don't count after you move your goalposts) is proof that they're missing out on some separate, nebulous vital force that they prematurely stopped looking for?
As for the supposed self-contradiction: I can see now why my concern about the black/white categorization was justified: you take one definition of "truth value", then smuggle in additional assumptions and apply it differently at the meta-level. My *concern* is with things that affect what I will observe. That's roughly the same as what I take "true" to refer to. Anything not related to observations will never be provable one way or another, so I don't bother trying, and I don't bother drawing inferences from those whose claims can't connect to observations, *especially* if they don't even realize that they can be! (Remember what I said about logical truths ...?)
Yes, you can go on believing things that don't correspond to observations. Be my guest! That's between you and your god (or Perfection, as the case may be). But it will still be useless to me. This position does not self refute, because it doesn't need to settle on an abstract "truth value" as differentiated from what I can expect to observe.
Gene wrote:
Stupid. 2) being part of 1) does not change the answer to my question....Now, your post about the philosophical "kewl kidz" (nice juvenile spelling, btw) was just dumb-assed...
Whoa there tiger. I realize your brain chemistry made you type those insults out, but by the same token my neurons are making me chastise your tone here. Remember, it is the Rothbardian wing of Austrian economics that resorts to name-calling as opposing to scholarly debate. You NYU guys are supposed to be above that.
Stupid. 2) being part of 1) does not change the answer to my question....Now, your post about the philosophical "kewl kidz" (nice juvenile spelling, btw) was just dumb-assed...
Whoa there tiger. I realize your brain chemistry made you type those insults out, but by the same token my neurons are making me chastise your tone here. Remember, it is the Rothbardian wing of Austrian economics that resorts to name-calling as opposing to scholarly debate. You NYU guys are supposed to be above that.
Silas, I'm not even going to read your whole post because it's so fucking stupid. It's not the POPULARITY of the views that's important, it's the DECISIVE REFUTATION of your views that's at issue. The refutation of the event regularity view is not SUPER SECRET, it's WELL KNOWN, and it has nothing to do with Oakeshott.
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
@Bob: You're just now noticing? 90% of Gene's "contribution" (and I use the term loosely) to this discussion has been name-calling or the intellectual equivalent.
@Gene: You don't notice the circularity there? When "your guys" refute reductionism, that counts, but when my guys substantiate it ... that somehow doesn't count?
Seems like you *are* ultimately arguing from the popularity among your preferred group.
Btw, you could real quick post a link to the even regularity refutation and what you believe I am using the term to refer to (you know, just to make sure you don't try to pull another fast one)? I'm interested in reading this -- Google doesn't show a lot of discussion of that term.
@Gene: You don't notice the circularity there? When "your guys" refute reductionism, that counts, but when my guys substantiate it ... that somehow doesn't count?
Seems like you *are* ultimately arguing from the popularity among your preferred group.
Btw, you could real quick post a link to the even regularity refutation and what you believe I am using the term to refer to (you know, just to make sure you don't try to pull another fast one)? I'm interested in reading this -- Google doesn't show a lot of discussion of that term.
Silas wrote:
@Bob: You're just now noticing?
No Silas, I'm just now saying something about it. I don't like wearing the Daddy pants.
Also, most coaches don't complain when the ref starts calling fouls that they think have been sliding the whole game.
@Bob: You're just now noticing?
No Silas, I'm just now saying something about it. I don't like wearing the Daddy pants.
Also, most coaches don't complain when the ref starts calling fouls that they think have been sliding the whole game.
Oh, and Bob: Reductionists are *fine* with you referring to "anger". The fact that it's reducible doesn't make the higher level abstraction of "anger" any less of a valid concept to use.
Silas wrote:
Wait: Bob, does this mean you think I've been *more* civil than Gene this time around?
Yes. And the f-bomb clinched it.
Wait: Bob, does this mean you think I've been *more* civil than Gene this time around?
Yes. And the f-bomb clinched it.
I think that's one thing you gotta like about me: when I'm going to be uncivil, I do it by elegantly condescending posts, rather than fire off obscenities.
I mean, yeah, it would be nice if I were just civil all the time, but if I'm not, I might as well make an art out of it, right? ;-)
I mean, yeah, it would be nice if I were just civil all the time, but if I'm not, I might as well make an art out of it, right? ;-)
Bob, I`m not hemming or hawing, but simply laboring to provide a little precision about what I mean, mainly because you and Gene refuse to pony up.
My ideas exist while I think them (and may even have a sort of existence before they spring into my conscious mind), I suppose that is true for others, and exists that are communicated or recorded exists as long as someone is able to perceive and interpret them. Otherwise, "ideas" have no objective existence.
That said, I believe that we have already agreed that the universe has a "structure" that exist independently of whether humans exist to perceive it, that we have been making process in understanding and describing that structure, but that, as we are fallible and not omniscient, our understanding of the universe and its apparent "laws" will always remain approximate and imperfect.
As to brains and minds, I have stated that it is quite helpful, when discussing human behavior, to refer to motivations, intentions and decisions, but in my own opinion it is clear that "minds" do not exist independently of brains, and that scientists continue to make progress in understanding the manner in which brains of all kinds, from fruit flies up to eggheads, perceive information and make decisions (both conscious and subconscious), how this decision-making process can go astray, and how it is influenced by the environment (including nutrition, chemistry, defects, injury, etc.).
IOW, brains and minds really are NOT two different things; a "mind" (like a feeling in one`s "heart" or "gut") is simply a common vernacular for the perceived activity of our (human) brains. However, it works well as a rule of thumb for those who have no understand about the way in which the brain serves as the seat of the mind (and for "mind"-less decisions by critters who are blessed only with brains, but no conscious mind).
cf. http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/ants_and_neurons/
My ideas exist while I think them (and may even have a sort of existence before they spring into my conscious mind), I suppose that is true for others, and exists that are communicated or recorded exists as long as someone is able to perceive and interpret them. Otherwise, "ideas" have no objective existence.
That said, I believe that we have already agreed that the universe has a "structure" that exist independently of whether humans exist to perceive it, that we have been making process in understanding and describing that structure, but that, as we are fallible and not omniscient, our understanding of the universe and its apparent "laws" will always remain approximate and imperfect.
As to brains and minds, I have stated that it is quite helpful, when discussing human behavior, to refer to motivations, intentions and decisions, but in my own opinion it is clear that "minds" do not exist independently of brains, and that scientists continue to make progress in understanding the manner in which brains of all kinds, from fruit flies up to eggheads, perceive information and make decisions (both conscious and subconscious), how this decision-making process can go astray, and how it is influenced by the environment (including nutrition, chemistry, defects, injury, etc.).
IOW, brains and minds really are NOT two different things; a "mind" (like a feeling in one`s "heart" or "gut") is simply a common vernacular for the perceived activity of our (human) brains. However, it works well as a rule of thumb for those who have no understand about the way in which the brain serves as the seat of the mind (and for "mind"-less decisions by critters who are blessed only with brains, but no conscious mind).
cf. http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/ants_and_neurons/
"exists that are communicated or recorded exists"
oops.
Should be "ideas that are communicated or recorded exist".
oops.
Should be "ideas that are communicated or recorded exist".
Bob, FYI: http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2009/09/21/murphy-and-callahan-on-my-brain-murphy-says-quot-the-brain-and-mind-are-not-the-same-thing-quot.aspx#FYI:
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